How often have
you heard the phrase, "No taxation without representation?" For many Americans
those words stir up strong patriotic feelings of embattled colonists overthrowing
oppressive British rule. When Parliament, the British legislature, levied
taxes on American colonists, some opponents claimed the action was repugnant
because Americans were not actually represented in Parliament, i.e. no Americans
served in Parliament and none voted in parliamentary elections. Those who
defended the taxes claimed that Americans were mainly English and therefore
virtually represented by other Englishmen.Although Dublin-born
British parliamentarian and Whig-pamphleteer Edmund Burke supported American
Independence, he rejected the idea of popular rule. In a famous speech to
his Bristol constituents Burke argued that
his behavior in Parliament should be informed by his knowledge and experience,
allowing him to serve as a trustee of the public interest, not as a delegate
for popular whim (1774).This module offers
you ways to learn more about the theory and practice of popular government.
It focuses upon political representation and legislative behavior and allows
you to compare representative policymaking in the California state legislature
with the making of policy through the direct democratic device of the initiative
process. It utilizes demographic data from the U.S. census, from election
returns for the state legislature, from rollcall votes in the legislature,
and from votes for and against popular initiatives.Are Americans
represented any better in their law-making bodies today than they were in
the British Parliament? Only about half those who are eligible to participate
in elections for members of Congress and state legislatures actually vote.
Further, we know that legislators are not representative in the sense they
are like most of their constituents. Typically, they are older, whiter, richer,
better educated, and more male than the average. Do those chosen to be representatives
really reflect the views of the people who elect them?In his famous
work titled "Representative Government" 18th-Century British political philosopher
and Utilitarian Party organizer John Stuart
Mill (1861) wrote:
The meaning of
representative government is, that the whole people, or some numerous portion
of them, exercise through deputies periodically elected by themselves the
ultimate controlling power....Contemporary political
scientist Hanna Pitkin provides a modern examination
of The Concept of Representation (1967). She considers several definitions of
representation, all of which have something to do with the relationship between
the people and their deputies, but none of which singly or in combination, adequately
defines the concept. She argues that the complexity of representation is partly
contained in the ideas of authorization, accountability, description, and symbolism.
Some writers see a representative as one who has been authorized by another
to act in the latter's stead. Accountability means representatives have
to answer to the represented for their actions, usually through elections. Description
is the idea that representatives resemble those they represent, in terms of
gender, ethnicity, religion, age, income, education, etc. Symbolism is
more emotional. It emphasizes the idea that the represented feel a representative
stands for them.For Pitkin, however,
the real test is how representatives act. Representation, she says, is "acting
in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them" (209).
This module asks you to examine the degree to which California state legislators
act as representatives of the people.Scholars have
studied representation ever since they perceived a linkage between the governed
and their government. Very early they pursued the study normatively (prescriptively),
as Plato (c. 386 BC) did in using the Socratic
method, and empirically (descriptively), as Aristotle
(c. 329-325 BC) did in outlining the constitutions of Greek city-states. Normative
theory asks what should be the connection between the people and law-making.
Empirical theory attempts to describe what that relationship is in practice.For the contract
theorists (Hobbes 1651; Locke
1689; Hume 1752; Rousseau
1762), the best method of representation varied, depending upon their views
of the human condition and the so-called state of nature. For Madison
(1788), a normativist, representation was a republican ideal. For Dahl
(1956), who both describes and prescribes, representation contributes to pluralism
where the public interest emerges from a struggle among special interests.
For the normative critics of pluralism (Lowi 1971) interest group representation exerts a corrupting influence on good
government. This century students of government and politics have continued
to use qualitative methods to study representation but also have begun to
use quantification in their research (Rice
1928). In 1961 Key used quantitative methods
to conclude empirically that the opinions of constituents do influence legislators'
votes. He claimed there is a relationship between the demographic characteristics
of a legislative district and the votes cast by its representative. This module
provides demographic data for you to use to replicate Key's research. Is his
conclusion still valid?From observing
four state law-making bodies Wahlke and his
colleagues (1962) discovered that legislators exhibited what the authors called
different representational styles (delegate, trustee, and politico) and clientele
roles (party, areal, pressure group, and administrative). Later they acknowledged
that this taxonomy is not a device to predict legislative behavior (Eulau
and Wahlke (1978). Do you find it useful to classify legislators in this
manner? Which style of representation do you prefer? Should legislators be
bound by the interests of their constituents? The most vocal ones? The one's
that are most likely to contribute to their reelection? Should legislators
study the issues, listen to all sides, and use their best judgment on how
to cast their votes? Or should they act one way or the other, depending upon
the issue or, perhaps, how close it is to the next election? What clientele
roles can you identify in the California Legislature?Miller
and Stokes (1963) examined more than 150 congressional districts to develop
their causal explanation of how opinions of voters may be transformed into
rollcall votes of legislators. The key element seemed to be that most legislators
are "for the people" because they are "of the people" as well as "by the people."
Can you test this model with data from the module?California's
LegislatureLike the U.S.
Congress and all other state legislatures except Nebraska, California's legislature
is bicameral, two houses, a lower house, the assembly, and an upper house,
the senate (California Constitution, Article 4,
section 1).The state is
divided by statute into 80 districts of approximately equal population (Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 1964) from which one assembly member is elected
every two years. No assembly member may be elected for more than three terms.
The senate is composed of 40 members elected from districts that combine two
assembly districts. Senators serve for four-year terms, with half elected
every two years. No senator may be elected for more than two terms (Proposition
140, November 6, 1990; however, see Jones
v Bates).In order to run
for a seat in the assembly or the senate one must be a U.S. citizen, a California
voter (California Constitution, Article 2,
section 2), a resident of California for at least three years immediately
preceding the election, and a resident of the district from which one is elected
for at least one year (California Constitution, Article
4, section 2).Before a bill
becomes law both houses must pass it in identical form by a recorded, rollcall
vote of a majority of the membership. Then the governor must approve the bill,
or if the governor vetoes it, it may become law if at least two-thirds of
the membership of each of the two houses re-pass it (California Constitution,
Article 4, sections 8 and
10).In your opinion
is the California legislature designed to represent the people? Do you believe
this kind of organization and procedure has a positive or negative effect
on the quality of laws that are passed?Twenty-four states,
including California, may make laws directly as well as indirectly (Council
of State Governments 1997). In California the initiative, a means of direct,
popular legislation, is considered to be a power reserved to the people when
the people granted other powers to their government. The initiative involves
a two-stage process, petition and election.Today, California's
initiative petition usually requires an expensive campaign funded by a large
group (even public officials), who draft a proposal and circulate it to gather
signatures of qualified voters. If at least five percent of those who voted
for the office of governor in the most recent election sign the petition,
the state secretary of state will certify the petition and place the measure
on the ballot at least 131 days later (California Constitution, Article
2, section 8). Groups or individuals may initiate law at the local level
with similar procedures (California Constitution, Article
2, section 11).Then competing
groups fund an even more expensive media campaign to persuade voters to vote
yes or no on the proposed law. If a majority of those voting on the measure
at the election approves it, it becomes law. If more than one measure on the
same issue pass at the same election, the one with the larger majority becomes
law (California Constitution Article 2, section
10).Do you expect
that laws passed by the initiative will be more representative of the people
or less representative than those passed by the legislature? Should the initiative
process be modified, abolished, or retained as it is?In Federalist
No. 10 James Madison (1787) argues against
direct popular lawmaking. He supports the new U.S. Constitution, which uses
representation. He attempts to refute those who oppose democracy by arguing
that the negative effects of popular rule can be ameliorated by representative
assemblies, that the intense interests of the people, which could lead to
excesses and abuses by the majority, will be dampened by passing popular passions
through a representative filter. In other words, he claims that when legislators
have to reconcile the different views of a large, diverse constituency, they
make better laws than the people do when allowed to legislate directly.Similarly, a
number of democratic theorists prefer representation over direct democracy,
not because direct lawmaking may be unwieldy with a large population but because
representation allows for face-to-face deliberation (Elshtain
1995; Nino 1996; Sartori
1987). They believe that discussing public policies rather than just voting
for or against them is the essential element in making good laws. What do
you think?
Last Modified 14 August 1998
